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Abstract
The rise in high-level languages for system administrators requires us to rethink traditional UNIX tools
designed for these older data formats. We propose new block-oriented tools, bgrep and bdiff, operating on
syntactic blocks of code rather than the line, the traditional information container of UNIX. Transcending
the line number allows us to introduce longitudinal diff, a mode of bdiff that lets us track changes across
arbitrary blocks of code. We present a detailed implementation roadmap and evaluation framework for
the full version of this paper. In addition we demonstrate how the design of our tools already addresses
several real-world problems faced by network administrators to maintain security policy.
Keywords: UNIX, configuration management, security policy
1 Introduction
High-level languages for system administrators are increasingly on the rise over flat-file or line-based for-
mats. Traditional UNIX tools, however, are geared towards these old file paradigms. In light of the variety
of modern programming languages available to system and network administrators, and given the success
and utility of grep and diff, we adapt and extend grep and diff for this new programming ecosystem.
Our new tools operate on syntactic blocks of code and text as the default information container, in contrast to
traditional tools that treat the line as the default. Syntactic blocks often correspond to meaningful higher-
level constructs ranging from a network interface in Cisco IOS, to a VirtualHost in Apache, to a section
of text within a normative reference document such as an IETF RFC.
Our block-based grep gives adminstrators a general mechanism to extract blocks of text or code that
match simple context-free patterns. Similarly, our block-based diff empowers administrators to compare
two versions of the same set of blocks over time. Moreover, we provide a natural extension to diff, longitu-
dinal diff, that enables an administrator to track changes made to a specific set of blocks (such as network
interfaces) as a time-series dataset.
High-Level Languages for System Administration are on the Rise System administrators are increas-
ingly turning to high-level programming languages to configure and manage their systems. Consider sys-
tem configuration in general. Last summer’sUSENIX Configuration Management Summit featured four tools
available to system administrators to programmatically configure their systems: CFEngine3, Bcfg2, Chef,
and Puppet [1]. CFEngine3 explicitly encodes promises among different system resources. Bcfg2 views
configuration management “as an API” for programming a system configuration. Chef views infrastruc-
ture as code that can benefit from software engineering practices. Finally, the Puppet language models the
desired state of datacenters.
We also notice this trend in network configuration management. At USENIX HotICE this year, one Cisco
engineer remarked that Cisco IOS is old and that model-driven architectures are the new direction to config-
ure networks. Consider Netconf, Yang, and Cisco NxOS. In addition, some consider network configuration
a form of distributed programming.
Traditional UNIX Tools were Designed for Simpler File Formats Two traditional UNIX workhorses are
grep and diff. However, these tools were designed for simpler file formats than modern system modeling
languages. During conversations with Doug McIlroy (inventor of diff and pipes, and arguably the first user
of the first UNIX), we identified several design decisions behind grep and their limitations [10].
1This work was supported in part by the NSF (under grant CNS-0448499), and the TCIPG project sponsored by the DOE (under
grant DE-OE0000097). The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted
as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of any of the sponsors.
2{gweave01,sws}@cs.dartmouth.edu
1
Grep First consider grep. Users can casually and quickly write regular expressions to extract structure
from a file. Originally, grep was written because Doug McIlroy needed to extract terms from a dictionary
but the dictionary was too large to load in his text editor. Therefore, the regular expression parser was
written in order to accommodate the limitations of the machine at the time.
Today, however, many of the languages and language constructs encountered by administrators are not
regular. There are a wide variety of languages found within configuration management packages such as
Chef. The unit of distribution within Chef, the cookbook, includes (among other things) configuration tem-
plates written in a configuration language specific to that utility, and recipes, Ruby scripts that specify how
to manage node resources.
Given the variety of languages, we cannot assume they are all regular. Although Ruby supports blocks
of code that are nested arbitrarily deep, one cannot write a regular expression that matches blocks of code
at an arbitrary depth [13].
We want to be able to extract syntactic blocks because they often encode meaningful units of information.
A practitioner may want to extract a particular method or set of methods from a Ruby recipie to see how
Powershell is installed depending upon the version of Windows on hosting node. Alternatively, a practi-
tioner maywant to extract the set of virtual hosts to quickly see how she has partitioned their organizational
domain into meaningful subdomains on a single server instance.
Diff Diff lets system administrators compare files by line. Today diff is a backbone in many version-
control systems. More recently, diff is used by the Really Awesome New Cisco Config Differ (RANCID), to
report changes to the configuration of a network device.
Many of the languages encountered by system administrators today, however, are no longer organized
by line number but in more complex syntactic structures. For example, Cisco IOS uses blocks of code to
denote interfaces. Today, line numbers are as much a consequence of data storage as they are of language
syntax. We argue that using the line as the primary information unit in these high-level languages is like
trying to compare two editions of a textbook by page number rather than by logical section.
Practitioners agreewith the need to reconsider line-based diff given today’s file formats. Bcfg2 lets admin-
istrators compare configuration models rather than files. These models include bundles, a logical grouping
on packages, files, and other entities that describe services on managed machines.
Bcfg2 represents configuration models as XML and its administrator comparison script (bcfg2-admin com-
pare) walks this XML tree between two versions in order to report changes.
However, XML comparison is not a general solution to the variety of languages encountered by the sys-
tem or network administrator including Cisco IOS. One network administrator at Dartmouth Computing
Services expressed interest in being able to compare arbitrary blocks of configuration files such as network
interfaces, and generate reports of how address-groups and other high-level constructs are used within
those interfaces over time.
This Paper In Section 2 of this paper, we relate the requirements for a diff and grep in the modern sysad-
min ecosystem to well-understood problems within theoretical computer science. In Section 3 we present a
roadmap for the implementation and evaluation of our tools bdiff and bgrep. Section 4 orients our research
in terms of hierarchical and longitudinal change, especially in network configuration management. Finally
Section 5 concludes.
2 Rethinking Diff and Grep
In this section, we describe two adaptations of grep and diff to the variety of data seen by system and net-
work administrators today. Having motivated the need to rethink these tools, we now recast these tools’
requirements in terms of long-studied, theoretical problems from computer science.
Our redesign of grep should empower administrators to casually extract “lightweight” context-free struc-
ture just as readily as they currently extract regular structure using traditional grep.3 Our redesign of diff
3We note that the term “lightweight” comes from Miller’s Ph.D thesis [14].
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should enable administrators to compare “parse-trees” of context-free structure just as readily as they can
compare lines using traditional diff.
2.1 A Grep for “Lightweight” Grammars
We rethink grep in terms of the languages used by modern system and network administrators and map
these requirements to the problem of defining lightweight grammars and parsing a file given a context-free
(or sensitive) structure.
Modern Requirements First, let us rethink grep in terms of how system administration and the comput-
ing environment in general has changed since grep’s arrival in March 3, 1973. We focus on the increase in
high-level, model-driven configuration languages.
One consequence of the increase in model-driven configuration languages is that meaningful constructs
of interest to administrators are represented as nested blocks of code that span multiple lines. Examples
include the aformentioned VirtualHost construct in Apache2, and the interface of Cisco IOS.
In contrast, the traditional UNIX environment of the 1970s used the line as a default information con-
tainer. For example, the original join command was designed to join on the entire line and only used the
first field as a key. However, as tabular formats became more common, the ability to parse and join on
arbitrary fields contained within each line was added. Consider awk, which operates upon records which
are default identified with lines.
Parsing and Lightweight Grammars Just as Thompson adapted the original join command to fielded
data, so do we propose to adapt grep to context-free structures that are increasingly prevalent due to the
rise in model-driven configuration.
Traditionally, writing a grammar and generating a parser for a language has not been viewed as a ca-
sual, spur-of-the-moment activity (as writing a regexp for grep might be). Although a great deal of time
is involved in writing a grammar for an entire language, we explore the idea of writing a grammar for a
subset of the entire language. For example, a system admin interested in VirtualHosts across multiple
machines does not need a parser for Apache’s entire configuration language, but just VirtualHost blocks.
Likewise, a network admin interested in her network interfaces does not need a parser for Cisco IOS,
but a parser for interface blocks (despite the fact that Cisco IOS lacks a formal grammar).
Consequently, we need somethingmore. Such a grep for context-free or sensitive structures would require
a system admin to specify a grammar for the structures of interest and a set of files from which to extract
matching structures. We believe this can be done by generating a parser for the context-free language that
ignores all but the desired structure and parsing the set of files. In Section 3 we describe the implementation
of our bgrep in more depth.
We should note that the process of identifying and understanding the generation of parse trees for subsets
of a given language may help avoid differential parse tree attacks [15].
2.2 A Diff for Parse Trees
We now rethink diff in terms of these lightweight, context-free structures used throughout modern config-
uration languages to model systems and networks. We map the requirements of such a difference engine
to the Hierarchical Change Detection Problem described by Chawathe et al. [6].
Modern Requirements Let us rethink diff in terms of the modern ecosystem of a system administrator.
Certainly, many things have changed since 1976 when the original diff paper was published. Among these
many things include the increase in high-level, model-driven configuration languages and the increase in
cheap storage.
The increase in model-driven languages translates into an increased need to compare blocks of code
across multiple editions of the same notional file. For example, an administrator of Apache2 may want
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Figure 1: Traditional line-based diff is too low-level because it ignores the block-based structure defined
by Cisco IOS. This real-world example from our research motivates the need for a block-based diff. The
ellipses indicate multiple blocks of code before and after the blocks depicted that caused longest common
subsequence (the algorithm used by diff ) to fail.
to compare two configurations of a particular VirtualHost. Alternatively, a network administrator may
want to compare two configurations of a particular interface.
As a consequence of the increase in cheap storage, we now have the luxury of reconsidering the window
of time over which system admins monitor changes to a configuration. Just as system administrators use
Nagios to monitor their infrastructure, we propose a longitudinal diff extension so that system admins can
monitor changes within a configuration as time-series data.
In contrast, longitudinal diff wasn’t a readily-available option for storage-limited, general-purpose com-
puters of the 1970s. Revision-control systems such as SCCS had to store the deltas between versions of files
rather than the files themselves due to storage limitations. Tools like RANCID hint at looking at changes
longitudinally, but being based on line diffing, do not enable admins to track changes to arbitrary sections
of a configuration model over time.
Hierarchical ChangeDetection Wepropose to adapt diff to context-free structures by leveraging Chawathe’s
work on theHierarchical Change Detection problem [6]. Our bgrep (block-based grep) returns a forest of parse
trees that match a given structure. If we apply our grep to two versions of the same file, thenwe can compare
the two versions of each of these parse trees.
The question then becomes, how do we compare these two versions of the same notional block? We
could simply recover the text by visiting the nodes of the parse tree in a prefix order and then compare the
text. However, depending upon the programming language we would be eliminating some useful infor-
mation. For example, in Cisco IOS, permuting two lines in an interface block has no effect on router
functionality but shows up as a change in RANCID that an administrator must sift through. Even worse,
permuting two interface blocks that span 5 lines a piece doesn’t affect router behavior, but may show
up as 10 deletes and 10 inserts in traditional diff. Figure 1 shows an example we encountered while diffing
multiple versions of a configuration file for a router at Dartmouth College.
Our bdiff (block-based diff) can avoid this noise by directly comparing the parse trees for two versions of
the same notional syntactic block. Chawathe describes a delta between two versions of hierarchical data via
aminimum cost edit script that is defined using node insert, node delete, node update, and subtree move. For
our purposes, we will assume that our syntactic blocks have unique identifiers so that we then just need to
compute an edit script. System administrators could provide a flag depending upon whether bdiff should
report permuted siblings as changes.
3 Implementation Roadmap and Proposed Evaluation
This section provides a roadmap for the implementation and proposed evaluation of our next-generation
grep and diff tools that we call bgrep and bdiff. In the full version of the paper, we will work with practition-
ers to implement the full suite of tools we propose. For this extended abstract, we discuss our tools in the
specific context of network configuration management.
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Figure 2: Our implementation roadmap, show building blocks completed and in progress, as well as the
full toolsuite we plan.
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Figure 3: Using bgrep, a network administrator may extract blocks of Cisco IOS related to “security
policy” within a given router (router.v1). Here, the administrator finds instances of the service-policy
command within two of the router’s interfaces. Our tool relies upon libraries of lightweight grammars
defined for configuration languages, and outputs configuration blocks as parse trees.
Figure 2 shows our current implementation roadmap for bgrep and bdiff. First consider our roadmap
for bgrep which consists of a library of tokens and patterns and an abstract syntax tree generator. Already
we have worked with practitioners to identify patterns related to security policy in network configuration
management (Cisco IOS) but plan to finish encoding these patterns in a library by the time of the full paper.
We would also like to work with practitioners to write patterns for another, but very different language
used by system administrators. Although we have prototype abstract syntax tree generator for entire Cisco
IOS files, we plan to generalize and polish our approach for the final paper.
Our roadmap for bdiff is even more direct. We already have implemented a tree difference engine, but
we plan to experiment with various tree edit distance algorithms before the final paper. Once we have the
ability to compare two versions of a file, we can write a small script that queries a versioned repository of
files to implement longitudinal diff mode within bdiff.
We see these tools as the first step towards a broader suite of block-oriented UNIX tools. For example,
bchglog could programatically generate human-readable edit scripts generated by our bdiff tool. This tool,
while beyond the scope of our current work, would remedy the prevalence of meaningless comments when
committing changes to revision control systems that include: “asdf”, “test”, and “Initial revision” [16].
Furthermore, we may be able to eventually extend bdiff to compare two notionally similar constructs
represented in two different languages. For example, a network administrator that is moving a subnet from
the border routers (that use Cisco IOS) to behind the enterprise firewall (on routers that use ASA) could diff
the old and new configuration files to ensure that she migrated all of the ACLs.
Bgrep Our bgrep is a general tool that will enable practitioners to extract blocks of code or text from a file
that are nested arbitrarily deep. For example, network administrators may be interested in extracting the
constructs related to “security policy” within any network interface on a given router.
Figure 3 illustrates how the system administrator can use bgrep to determine which interfaces implement
constructs related to security policy. First, the administrator defines a library of patterns related to her no-
tion of “security policy” in Cisco IOS; this library includes how to tokenize (via Lex) and parse (via Yacc)
constructs that may include service-policy, and policy-map. The reference to the pattern library and
router file is passed to bgrep which parses the configuration file and emits a parse tree whose leaves are
blocks of code that match security constructs. In the figure above, network interfaces 2 and 3 both contain
the service-policy command.
5
BDIFF
router.v1.config Cisco ACL tokens/patterns
bdiff  -pattern iosSecPol router.v0 router.v1
router.v0.config
v1
interface 3
v0
interface 2
BDIFF
router.v100 Cisco ACL tokens/patterns
bdiff  -sD "05.22.04" -eD "05.28.09" router -pattern iosSecPol
router.v4
bdiff  -sD "05.22.04" -eD "05.28.09" router -pattern iosVLAN
time
nu
m
 c
ha
ng
es
iosSecPol
iosVLAN
interface 2
Figure 4: Using bdiff, a network administrator may track differences in the implementation of security
policy across multiple versions of the same router. Here, the administrator may either specify two versions
of the same router to compare or sequentially compare versions of the router across time via longitudinal
diff mode.
Evaluation In the full version of this paper, we will work with several real-world administrators to eval-
uate the utility of bgrep. For network administration, we have already been working with Dartmouth Col-
lege’s Computing Services to find out their needs first-hand. In addition, they have given us access to
approximately 5 years of network configuration data for the campus network. This will allow us to query
the network at arbitrary points in time to count how many interfaces were configured with security policy
constructs.
In addition, we have also contacted a system administrator at Tufts who uses Puppet to manage his in-
frastructure (a former coworker of the first author). We anticipate this to be a rich source of feedback on how
bgrep helps administrators understand and track patterns within their configuration management systems.
Bdiff Our bdiff is a general tool that will enable system and network administrators to compare multi-
ple versions of the same notional block of code. Network administrators, may be interested in comparing
constructs related to security policy within two versions of a file to see how they changed. Additionally,
administrators may want to measure how frequently security policy changed over a span of time using our
longitudinal diff feature.
Figure 4 illustrates how a network administrator can use bdiff to directly measure how a router’s imple-
mentation of a security policy changed between two versions of that router’s configuration file. As before,
the administrator defines (or downoads) a library of patterns relate to security policy in Cisco IOS and also
passes in a sequence of files to compare. The, command returns an edit script that consists solely insertions,
deletions, and moves of configuration blocks that matched security policy patterns.
Our figure also illustrates how a network administrator may use bdiff to generate reports of how Cisco
IOS blocks relating to security policy and VLANs changed over time. Using a version-control system like
subversion, we can retrieve a sequence of configuration files for a given router ordered in time. We then
can do pairwise comparisons of the parse trees generated, count the number of edits per comparison, and
graph the trends in time. Since these functions are piecewise linear, we can even use the area under these
curves to calculate the relative amount of “work” needed to maintain VLANs versus “security policy”.
Evaluation As mentioned above, the full version of this paper will include several real-world network
and system administrators to evaluate the utility of bgrep. Already though, our collaboration with Dart-
mouth College’s Computing Services has helped us in developing this next-generation diffing tool.
We see bdiff as a potential answer to the problem of understanding and maintaining a network security
policy. Security policies link high-level security goals to system behavior and must evolve in order for a
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system to remain secure [24]. As router configuration files evolve, however, their referential complexity
increases, and with it, their chance of misconfiguration [2].
Already, we have designed bgrep to solve a problem faced by real practitioners. Although network ad-
ministrators implement security goals within router ACL policies and firewalls, to the best of our knowl-
edge, no tools enable administrators to easily compute how much time they spend on “policy” or how the
implementation of policy has changed across time.
4 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to reconsider traditional UNIX tools given the increase in
higher-level languages that include non-regular constructs (such as blocks nested at arbitrary depth). Cer-
tainly others have seen the need to programmatically extract and compare blocks of text. We consider XSLT,
and XML-based diffing tools within this realm of research [8, 20]. However, the variety of languages seen
by system administrators requires a more general approach; for example Ruby is not an XML format but it
is useful to express resources in Bcfg2.
Hierarchical and Longitudinal Change As mentioned before, the bdiff tool we propose leverages work
done by Chawathe [6].
Our work also applies Zhao et al.’s 2005 best student paper “XML Structural Delta Mining,” which ar-
gues the benefits of mining change patterns in XML documents [25]. Our bdiff ’s “longitudinal diff” mode
generalizes this approach to parse trees. Additionally, Bottcher et al. introduce the new paradigm of Change
Mining as “data mining over a volatile, evolving world with the objective of understanding change” [4].
More specifically, longitudinal studies of network configuration files has been a topic of interest since
around 2009. Benson et al. demonstrated that the referential complexity of networks increases over time [2].
Sung et al. mined associations between blocks of Cisco IOS configurations including [19]. Plonka et al. ex-
plored the viability of software engineering techniques within the domain of network configuration [16].
Others that have done longitudinal studies of router configurations include Sun et al. [18] and Chen [7].
Tools for Security Policy Change Management This work fits into our broader pattern of prior work in
building tools to enable human users to better manage policies of various types. Security policies range
from human-readable normative reference works to lower-level router configuration files. We have devel-
oped tools that work with both.
Our previous workwith natural-language policies focused on PKI certificate policy formalization [21, 23].
Our hierarchical model of policy is based on over 20 years of experience to model, reference, and retrieve
Classical texts [9, 11, 22]. Others [3, 17, 5, 12] have experimented with formalizing high-level policy, but at
the expense of necessary ambiguity (for legal purposes) and human-readability.
Our previous work with lower-level security policies expressed within router configuration files ap-
peared this year in USENIX HotICE [24]. As mentioned previously, others have done longitudinal studies
of network configuration, but have not focused on the application to managing changes within security
policy. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to observe that practitioners express
security policy in multiple layers that must stay synchronized and must change to maintain security. Our
ongoing work, therefore, focuses on tools that can detect change across multiple languages that a network
or system administrator may encounter.
5 Conclusion
We have just introduced bdiff and bgrep, tools that operate on syntactic blocks of code and text instead of
the line (the traditional information container in UNIX). Despite the variety of programming languages
that system and network administrators may encounter, syntactic blocks remain a general interface through
which one may extract and compare high-level information from multi-versioned files. Furthermore, “lon-
gitudinal diff” presents a powerful paradigm for understanding the evolution of individual components
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of a network or other system. We believe the design of our tools to be truly general purpose and equally
applicable to other block-based languages such as those defined by normative reference documents or even
interfaces within source code.
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